The Search for a Viable Foreign Economic Policy by Church, Frank




The Search for a Viable Foreign Economic Policy
Frank Church
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Part of the International Law Commons, International Trade Commons, Law and Economics
Commons, and the Politics Commons
This Perspective is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Frank Church, The Search for a Viable Foreign Economic Policy, 1 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 46 (1979)
The Search for a Viable Foreign
Economic Policy
Senator Frank Church*
United States foreign policy is, to a great degree, influenced by the
performance of the international economy. This fact was brought
home with dramatic force in 1973, when Arab oil-producing countries
suddenly quadrupled the price of oil. That abrupt increase in price,
followed by the Arab oil embargo, nearly crippled the economies of the
industrial nations of the west. The recent political upheaval in Iran
and its affect on the world oil supply is only another poignant example
of the extent to which the performance of the American economy,
which obviously includes our national and multinational business en-
terprises, is intimately affected by external economic factors. It is be-
coming increasingly apparent that, in the global village, politics cannot
be separated from economics and business.
Therefore, in discussing trade relations between the United States
and other countries, it is necessary to address the political as well as the
economic aspect of U.S. foreign trade policy. The debilitated state of
U.S. foreign trade is due, not only to the weakened state of the world
economy, but also to the inability of the major Western countries to
cooperate in expanding their economies, thus mutually increasing im-
ports. Added to this has been the inability of U.S. industry to take
advantage of the devaluation of the dollar to out-sell foreign exports in
domestic sales. After briefly canvassing the efforts of the international
community to strengthen the world economy, placing the efforts made
in a political milieu, one solution to the problem suggests itself. Global
economic erosion has been caused in major part by the drastic reduc-
tion in the purchasing power of industrial nations highly dependent on
oil. In 1977, President Carter launched an international initiative
designed to reverse the declension in the world-wide economic growth
rate. The Carter Administration sought to convince Germany and Ja-
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pan that the declining growth rate could only be reversed if they coop-
erated with the United States in stimulating their economies to a high
level of economic activity. Higher economic growth rates were to be
achieved through tax cuts and increased government spending. Faster
growth in these countries would lead to a greater demand for imports
from other, weaker economies. Hence, Germany, Japan, and the
United States would act as three "locomotives" to pull the rest of the
world out of the economic slump.
The success of the President's proposal depended on the willing-
ness of Germany and Japan to move into current account deficit or, at
the very least, to reduce their large surpluses. Such action would re-
lieve some of the balance of payments pressure on the many weaker
industrial countries.
Germany and Japan, however, did not receive the Adminstration's
international economic strategy with much enthusiasm. At the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) ministe-
rial meeting in the summer of 1976, both governments agreed to certain
coordinated national growth targets for 1977. Although these targets
were substantially below what the Adminstration had suggested, only
the United States came close to meeting its target. Due to strong stimu-
lative measures undertaken by the Carter Administration, the U.S.
economy scored an impressive recovery in 1977 which continued into
1978. The Gross National Product rose by almost 11% 1, and the unem-
ployment rate fell from its postwar high of 9.1% in mid-1975, to about
6%.2 In addition, excess capacity in the United States - the difference
between actual production and available capacity in the manufacturing
sector - dropped to 17%.3 In 1978, the Gross National Product rose by
3.9%,4 unemployment dipped slightly,5 and capacity utilization contin-
ued to rise.6
While the United States increased its growth rate, Germany and
Japan continued to pursue a policy of slow growth. In both countries,
the unemployment rate actually rose. In 1977, the German economy
expanded only 2.5%, and Japan's growth rate fell to less than half of its
I BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 441 (Table No. 710) (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 ABSTRACT].
2 Id at 398 (Table No. 643).
3 23 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 10 (Table No. 6) (1978). See 1978 ABSTRACT, s.upra note 1,
at 807 (Table No. 1405).
4 Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1979, at 3, col. 1.
5 1978 ABSTRACT, sut.pra note 1, at 398 (Table No. 643).
6 Id at 807 (Table No. 1405).
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historic average of over 10%.7 Excess capacity remained at 17% in Ger-
many and 16% in Japan.8 In 1978, Germany's growth performance did
not exceed 4%.9 Although Japan has pledged to make its "best efforts"
to accelerate the nation's growth rate to 7%, its growth has hovered
around 6% because of the deflationary effect of the appreciation of the
yen. 10
At the current Tokyo Round, representatives from Germany, Ja-
pan, Canada, the United States, and other Western industrialized na-
tions appear to be moving toward agreement on a common economic
policy.' ) While the United States has exerted heavy pressure on Ger-
many and Japan to reduce their huge trade surpluses, 12 they have com-
plained bitterly that the United States pursued for too long a policy of
"benign neglect" with regard to the dollar and its prodigious appetite
for imported oil.13 The intensity of the mutual recriminations made it
unlikely that any workable compromise could be reached in the forsee-
able future.
Instead of placing the blame on its trading partners, the United
States should abandon its diplomatic efforts aimed at forcing the Ger-
man and Japanese governments to do what they are clearly unwilling
or perhaps unable to do. For instance, the Germans are traditionally
preoccupied with inflation. Their concern is not misplaced given their
experience with hyper-inflation in the inter-war period. Both the Ger-
man government and the public appear willing to accept a very modest
rate of growth and a high level of unemployment in return for stable
prices. Nonetheless, under the guidance of Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt, Germany maintains one of the world's least inflationary econ-
omies and is presently the strongest economy in the West. 14
Also, despite Japanese assurances to the contrary, it is equally un-
likely that Japan will alo much to eliminate its large trade surplus. The
7 Lewis, In the West, a New Conservatism, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1979, § 12 (International
Economic Survey), at 45.
8 23 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 3.
9 Geddes, Germany's Long-Sought Upturn Takes Hold, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1979, § 12 (Inter-
national Economic Survey), at 46.
10 Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 1978, at 1, col. 5.
11 Lewis, For Freer Trade, Still a Long Haul, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1979, § 12 (International
Economic Survey), at 9.
12 Scott-Stokes, Third World Industrializes, Challenging the West, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1979, §
12 (International Economic Survey), at 13.
13 Wall St. J., Nov. 14, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
14 Crittenden, .4 New World Disorder, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1979, § 12 (International Eco-
nomic Survey), at 38.
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Japanese economy is uniquely export-oriented.1 5 Due to Japan's reli-
ance on foreign oil for 70% of its energy needs,' 6 the Iranian crisis and
the recent OPEC price increase have reinforced the Japanese emphasis
on exports. Moreover, because of Japan's enormous 16% spare produc-
tive capacity,' 7 a drastic reduction in Japan's exports would create
havoc within her economy.
The intransigence of the Japanese government became clear in the
Strauss Agreement of 1978, when the Japanese goverment made an ef-
fort to placate the United States through trade talks with the U.S. Spe-
cial Trade Representative, Robert S. Strauss.18 Japan's concessions
under the Strauss Agreement, however, were little more than placating
gestures. The projected 10% cutback in. steel exports to the United
States and the 40% cut in the sale of color television sets will mean, at
most, a reduction of only $700 million in Japanese exports.' 9 Japan
also pledged to hold auto sales in the United States to the prior year's
level. However, 1977 was a banner year for Japanese auto sales in the
United States, with a 36% increase over the previous year.20
Japanese import concessions under the Strauss Agreement were
equally modest. Japan has promised to buy large :quantities of en-
riched uranium, non-ferrous metals, and commercial aircraft from the
United States, but these sales will mean only a one-time increase in
U.S. exports.2 1 Far more significant would be an agreement to reduce
Japan's special tariff fees and quotas on imported food products. When
a nation enjoys a Gross National Product of $700 billion and imports a
meager $15 billion in manufactured goods, 22 there is considerable room
for adjustment.
Sharp disagreement over a common economic policy has become a
major source of political dissension among the Western nations and
Japan. Since 1977, the international community has witnessed a long
series of summits, OECD ministerials, International Monetary Fund
meetings, and bilateral consultations devoted to the solution of eco-
nomic problems. Each met with the same result: world leaders entered
speaking optimistically of "interdependence" and "cooperation," but
15 Misawa, Tokyo as an International Capital Mfarket--ts Economic and Legal Aspects, 8
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 3 (1974).
16 Phone Statement by the Japanese Embassy to the offices of Senator Frank Church in Wash-
ington, D.C. (March 1978).
17 23 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 3.
18 Special Trade Representative's Office, Statement Release (March 1978).
19 Id
20 Id
21 Strauss-Ushiba Communique (1978).
22 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. (newsletter), April 1978, at 5.
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emerged grim-faced and empty-handed. Even the current Tokyo
Round displays the countries' calls for greater trade.23 Yet, despite
these efforts, national economic growth targets have not been met, and
trade imbalances have not improved.
Diplomatic relations among the main protagonists, Germany, Ja-
pan, and the United States, have taken on distinctly strained overtones.
To be sure, the weakened dollar has placed the United States in a
weakened position despite President Carter's economic rescue efforts.
Mutual recriminations and finger-pointing have become such wide-
spread practices that it is difficult to predict which is likely to become
more tense-a U.S. arms summit with the Russians or the next eco-
nomic summit with our major trading partners and closest allies.
The July 1978 Economic Summit in Bonn apparently followed the
same pattern. Once again, the heads of state who met in Bonn agreed
on a comprehensive strategy covering growth, employment, inflation,
and international monetary policy. Yet, when one examines the com-
mitments stemming from the Summit, one finds, for the most part,
goals couched in broad generalities. The hoped-for break-through in
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, a major objective of the Bonn
summit, failed to materialize. Participating nations were unable to
reach an agreement on vital areas under negotiation, such as market
access for agricultural products and the reduction of non-tariff trade
barriers. Possibly, these goals will be finally realized in 1979.
The recent New Year's Summit in Guadelupe of President Carter,
Chancellor Schmidt, Prime Minister Callaghan, and President Giscard
d'Estaing resulted in more promises of economic cooperation among
the Western nations.24 The substantive results remain to be seen.
Indeed, Americans have found it difficult, both in the private and
the public sector, to form a unified and effective economic program
designed to deal with America's two greatest enemies: inflation and de-
valuation of the dollar. The $32 billion trade deficit of the United
States25 and, in particular, its voracious appetite for foreign oil, have
created a crisis of confidence in the American dollar. The year 1978
marked a period in which the value of the dollar plummeted. In the
last two years, the value of the dollar dropped 34% against the Japanese
yen and 22% against the Deutsche mark.26 On the inflation front, the
23 Lewis, supra note 11.
24 NEWSWEEK, Jan. 15, 1979, at 37.
25 1978 ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 858 (Fig. no. 31.2).
26 Hershey, The Dollar's Tough Road Back, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1979, § 12 (International
Economic Survey), at 38.
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United States has performed poorly in comparison to its trading part-
ners; 1978 was marked by double-digit inflation.27 Germany and Ja-
pan, however, appear to have their inflation rates well in hand, with
rates of about 3% and 4% respectively.28
The depreciation in the value of the U.S. dollar could have led to a
reduction in the U.S. trade deficit. United States industries are prima-
rily responsible, for they have not chosen to take advantage of the de-
preciation.
For example, the rapid depreciation of the dollar during the first
half of 1978, particularly against the currencies of Detroit's two most
serious competitors in the small car market, Germany and Japan, of-
fered American auto makers an unexpected opportunity to recapture
the small car markets lost to imports. Rather than seizing this opportu-
nity, U.S. automakers utilized this depreciation as an excuse for raising
their own prices on compact cars. As a result, they squandered the
opportunity to recapture their lost dominance of the American market
and contributed further to the inflationary spiral. In 1978, Ford, Gen-
eral Motors, and Chrysler announced significant price increases for
their sub-compacts, while only American Motors was willing to lower
prices in that category.29 In effect, any price advantage the auto indus-
try could have gained from the dollar's depreciation was lost by a com-
bination of greed and lack of foresight. Piecemeal increases instituted
by the major auto manufactuers during 1978 are already continuing
into 1979.30 In December, GM and Ford announced increases averag-
ing 0.5% on 1979 models.3' In 1978 alone, GM announced six separate
price increases.32 If this pattern of behavior is followed by other U.S.
manufacturers, the depreciation of the dollar may not help solve the
U.S. trade problems.
Further, most nations believe that the United States could contrib-
ute to a healthier economic climate by controlling its rate of energy
consumption and by reducing the amount of oil it imports. The current
threat of gas rationing indicates vividly that the United States is truly a
profligate in its energy habits. Far more than in any other society, the
American style of living is built around the automobile. It is not
merely because Americans enjoy driving cars; they simply have no al-
27 Farnsworth, In the U.S., an Accomodation to Inlation, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1979, § 12
(International Economic Survey), at 46.
28 Hershey, supra note 26, at 42.
29 Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 1978, at 3, col. 1.
30 Id
31 Wall St. J., Dec. 6 at 1, coL 2; id Dec. 13, at 2, col. 2.
32 Id
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ternative. Patterns of work and play, the structure of American cities,
and the rural lifestyle are all based upon universal access to the auto-
mobile.
In addition to the task of reducing oil imports, the United States
must face an even more difficult problem: during the past decade,
American industry lost much of its competitive position in foreign mar-
kets. What the United States needs, I believe, is a recapitalization of
private industry. Since 1969, productivity in this country has actually
declined.33 American industries have simply not put back into produc-
tion enough of what they have taken out. In comparison to the per-
formance of other industrial countries, U.S. reinvestment has been
dismal. While Japan plows back an average of 35% of its Gross Na-
tional Product into capital expenditures, and Germany 26%, the United
States spends an average of only 18% on reinvestment.3 4 Even indus-
tries which have shown modest productivity gains have not kept pace
with their foreign competitors. The steel industry is a case in point.
While the Germans and the Japanese have adopted the most effi-
cient and technologically advanced means of production, many U.S.
steel plants have been allowed to decline into obsolescense. From 1964
to 1975, productivity in the U.S. steel industry increased only 17.5%,
while the Common Market countries raised their productivity by
89.5%, and Japan increased hers by 166%.35 As a consequence of its
outmoded plants, the U.S. steel industry cannot compete either at home
or abroad.
Unlike other U.S. industries, American agriculture has made sig-
nificant gains in productivity. It is no coincidence, then, that agricul-
ture is also the most successful U.S. export industry.36 Following the
example set by the agricultural industry, increased productivity of
American industries could spur economic growth and reduce the U.S.
trade deficit without fueling inflation.
To stimulate reinvestment, better incentives must be provided for
the investment of risk capital in the United States. It is not enough to
wait for activity among private investors; the federal government must
take action. For the past 36 years, risk capital has suffered from overly
burdensome taxation. Excessive personal income taxes, exacerbated by
an inflation which raises taxpayers into higher income brackets, have
33 Caterpillar Tractor Corp., National Policy for U.S. Exports (Oct. 1978) (speech by Lee
Morgan).
34 Id
35 COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRICES AND
COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES STEEL INDUSTRY 45 (Table 111-2) (Oct. 1977).
36 1978 ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 417 (Table No. 678).
Foreign Economic Policy
1:46(1979)
squeezed large numbers of middle and upper-income earners out of the
investment market. In addition, the capital gains tax has made invest-
ment risks increasingly less attractive to those people who can still af-
ford them. The combination of the two has driven money out of
productive investment and into tax shelters such as tax-free bonds.
High tax rates are not merely curtailing investments; they may be re-
ducing the flow of revenues to the Treasury. In 1968, when the capital
gains tax rate was only 25%, the tax drew in $7.2 billion in revenues.37
In 1977, at rates that reached as high as 50%, the tax produced only $8
billion in revenue.38 Moreover, the capital gains revenue, as a percent
of total taxes, dropped from 9.3% in 1968 to 4.5% in 1975. 39
Financial experts have largely attributed the post-war economic
boom in Germany to the Adenauer Government's decision to ignore
the advice of American State Department economists. 40 Against such
advice, the Government proceeded to make drastic cuts in taxes. As a
result, the freed capital fueled new economic activity which provided
more revenue to the public treasuries. In the United States, the Ken-
nedy tax cuts of 1964 produced a surge of non-inflationary growth.41
Unfortunately, the growth passed unnoticed, for it was quickly dissi-
pated by the onset of the Vietnam War.
The tax cut remedy has worked in the past; I believe the United
States should try it again. With interest rates on the rise, the United
States presently faces an economic crisis. This country must decide
whether to support a free enterprise system or abandon it. If the U.S.
government continues to squeeze the private sector with excessive taxes
and high interest rates, people will abandon the capital markets and the
choice will have been made.
I strongly support the new tax laws, effective January 1, 1979,
which, among other things, reversed the 36-year trend of higher capital
gains taxes. 42 The maximum rate on corporate capital gains has been
reduced to 28%.43 The result in the long run will be salutory for both
the economy and the Treasury. A clear decision to cut taxes eliminates
much of the uncertainty that has discouraged the business community
from reinvesting its profits. I recommend that the maximum rate of
taxation on individual income, whether earned or unearned, should be
37 124 CONG. REc. E2172 (daily ed. April 26, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kemp).
38 Id
39 Id
40 Id E2377 (daily ed. May 4, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kemp).
41 Id
42 Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1978, at 8, col. 1.
43 Id
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reduced to 48%. Within a short period of time, the loss of revenue to
the Government should be more than replenished through the in-
creased economic activity stimulated by the cut.
The new tax cuts do not help the middle-income taxpayer. The
tax savings on capital gains will be offset by (1) the planned Social
Security tax increases and (2) the boost people receive into higher tax
brackets because of inflation. Admittedly, corporations have received
additional tax relief, including an increase on the investment credit. I
believe, however, that no American citizen should have to pay a higher
rate of income tax than does General Motors. Therefore, tax reforms
for individuals must continue.
Rather than relying on diplomacy to convince Germany and Ja-
pan to adopt a common economic policy-a futile endeavor, it is time
for the United States to focus on the fundamental shortcomings of its
own economy. Let the United States declare an economic detente with
Europe and Japan. Let them proceed with the policies they regard as
best, while the United States undertakes to bolster its own competitive
position in the world marketplace. In the end, this may bring us closer
together-both politically and economically-far sooner than any "lo-
comotive" they are unwilling to board.
